At a shooting range in Southern California, a window-film dealer put on a demonstration for school officials. With an employee crouched behind a sample window, he threw a rock at the glass, then swung a metal baseball bat at it. The glass cracked but held. A facilities officer planning a new high school stepped closer and said, “I’m sold.”
Forced-entry resistant design is often decided the same way, on the strength of a demonstration or a product rating. Government facilities are no exception. An architect designs to minimum security standards, the drawings pass review, and nobody asks who the building is supposed to stop, or how long it needs to hold them.
The officer had watched a real test, with real glass and a real bat. Yet the window that impressed him differed in one significant way from every window in his schools, and that difference changed what the demonstration proved. It also sits at the center of how fortified facilities should be designed, starting with the standards most projects are built to.
Why Meeting Minimum Standards Isn’t the Same as Forced-Entry Resistant Design
Federal standards answer the question only part of the way. For DoD buildings, UFC 4-010-01 sets minimum antiterrorism standards and applies to facilities where no specific threat has been identified. Civilian agencies follow the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) risk management process, which assigns each facility a security level and baseline countermeasures. Both are starting points for a building whose threat is still undefined.
Once a threat is defined, the standards change role. UFC 4-020-01 and the ISC process explain how to turn a known threat into design criteria, but someone first has to describe the threat. That is the job of a threat, vulnerability, and risk assessment (TVRA) built around a specific site and its likely adversaries.
Because every site differs, a TVRA should never be a “cookie-cutter” exercise, as one protective-design engineer argued in Forbes. What it produces is a Design-Basis Threat (DBT): who might attack, with what tools, for how long, and what they want. Threat-informed protective design takes its direction from that document, so it needs to be finished before the architect fixes the footprint.

How Facilities Are Breached, and What Each Threat Demands of the Design
A DBT describes the force a building has to resist, and that force usually takes one of three forms. Each asks something different of the design, which is why a door rated against one tells you little about the others.
Hand and Power Tools
The most common is a person with tools. Most forced-entry testing, including ASTM F3038, measures how long a complete assembly holds against hand tools. A prepared adversary with power tools moves faster, so the DBT has to say which kind of attacker the building is meant to delay. Roofs, hatches and utility penetrations deserve the same scrutiny as doors.
Vehicles
A vehicle changes the scale of the problem. It can carry an intruder or a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) toward the building, so hostile vehicle mitigation begins at the site plan, with standoff distance, controlled approach angles and barriers crash-tested to ASTM F2656.
A crash rating describes a barrier on the day it was tested. Bourbon Street’s vehicle barriers came out of a $40 million safety plan launched in 2017, and by late 2024 the original bollards had proved unreliable and were being replaced. On January 1, 2025, with that work still underway, a driver sped down Bourbon Street and killed 14 people. The rating mattered only as long as the barrier was in place and working.
Explosives
Explosives bring a third set of demands, ones that forced-entry ratings leave open. Blast mitigation strategies deal with hazardous glazing, structural response and progressive collapse mitigation, which is why a blast engineer belongs on the team early. The two kinds of protection can pull in different directions: a door built to resist an hour of prying may still fail under blast pressure, and a blast-rated window can give way quickly to a pry bar.
Delay Only Works If Detection and Response Can Use It
Whatever form the threat takes, resistance is measured in time. Fifteen minutes of forced-entry resistance matters only if the intrusion is detected early and a response arrives before those minutes run out. That makes delay, detection and response a single design problem. Sensors, access control and the response plan are sized to the delay each layer provides, and every layer still has to let occupants out.
Stacking layers this way is the basis of defense-in-depth. The U.S. Embassy in London took the idea into landscape. Bollards rated to stop an eight-ton truck are hidden inside a yew hedge, and behind them a seating wall, two sharp grade changes, a vehicle-trapping ditch and a 100-foot pond stand between the street and the building.
The embassy it replaced shows the alternative. In 2007 the Grosvenor Square building received a $15 million upgrade: blast walls, planters and traffic barriers fitted around a structure never designed for them. Planners still judged it insufficient. The new site was laid out around protection from the start, and from the street it reads as a park.

Rated Products vs. Tested Assemblies
Layers only add time if each one performs the way its rating says, which brings us back to the shooting range. The dealer’s sample window was 3/8-inch annealed glass. Schools typically have 1/4-inch tempered glass, which shatters into small pebbles and is less likely to stay in its frame. The officials had watched a test on a window they didn’t own.
A Wall Street Journal investigation found that schools had spent more than $100 million on window film, some of it sold with promises the film’s own manufacturers don’t make. One dealer’s “independent” test lab shared his company’s address. The conflict is an old one: in 2005, TIME reported that the company running mock attacks on U.S. nuclear plants also guarded about half the nation’s reactors.
Evidence that holds up is traceable: it names the standard, the rating level and who performed the test. For a manufactured product, that means a third-party report on the complete assembly (door, frame, hardware and anchorage), tested to ASTM F3038 or the State Department’s SD-STD-01.01 at the level the DBT requires. A custom-engineered assembly should come with its engineering basis and the standards it was designed to meet or exceed.
How DSI Approaches Forced-Entry Resistant Design
Each of these steps depends on understanding how facilities are defeated, and our design process starts there. DSI’s leadership has supported special operations organizations and government force protection programs, including vulnerability assessments of government facilities, military installations and critical infrastructure. We use that experience to engineer weaknesses out of a facility before construction begins.
In practice, we look at each project from the adversary’s side first: how they would approach the site, which entry points and utility dependencies they would target, and how much delay each layer must provide. The answers shape site layout, access control, compartmentalization and emergency isolation, so critical asset protection is part of the structure from the first drawing, for a federal agency or a private estate.
The same threat profile sets the protection level. We don’t assign a universal ballistic or forced-entry rating; each is chosen for the client’s threats and operations, then specified against the UL, ASTM, NIJ or other recognized standard that fits the application. Where an established design falls short of the threat, we custom-engineer and fabricate purpose-built solutions intended to exceed applicable government requirements.
DSI is a Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB), CAGE 81HC4. Our founders and key personnel hold active DoD Secret clearances and bring 40 years of combined uniformed service to every fortified construction project.

What to Ask a Military Facility Hardening Contractor
A few questions will show whether a firm works this way. Ask each contractor on your list to:
- Show how they translate a TVRA into a measurable design basis.
- Provide third-party test reports for each manufactured assembly in its installed configuration, and the engineering basis for any custom-engineered one.
- Explain how they control substitutions when a tested product becomes unavailable.
- Describe how security-critical work is documented before it is concealed.
- Explain how they protect sensitive drawings and threat information.
For set-aside procurements, confirm SDVOSB status through SBA VetCert and SAM.gov.
Picture a new facility designed to minimums. Its walls meet code, its doors carry ratings copied from product sheets, and its bollards appear on the drawings. Nobody has written down who the building is meant to stop, or for how long, so nobody can say whether it will.
Now picture the same facility after a TVRA. Its design basis names the threat and the delay each layer must provide. Each assembly comes with test or engineering documentation that matches what was installed, and response times are set against the delay. From the street, the building looks much the same. Its owner, though, can now say with evidence what it will hold against.
If your next facility has to hold against a determined adversary, the best time to bring DSI in is before the footprint is set.
Frequently Asked Questions
Each measures a different threat. Forced-entry resistance is the time an assembly delays a person using tools, ballistic resistance is whether it stops specified rounds under standards such as UL 752 or NIJ 0108.01, and blast resistance is how it responds to explosive pressure. Because each is tested separately, a product rated for one hasn’t been shown to perform against the others.
UFC 4-010-01 is written for DoD buildings where no specific threat has been identified, so it provides a baseline. A facility with an identified threat needs criteria developed through UFC 4-020-01 or the ISC process, including forced-entry delay times tied to its Design-Basis Threat.
ASTM F3038 times how long a complete forced-entry-resistant system, such as a door, window, wall, roof or louver, holds against attack with hand tools. Any design change requires retesting, so the installed product should match the configuration that earned the rating.
